Despite the central importance of investors to all IPO theories, relatively little is known about their role in practice. In this paper we survey institutional investors about how they assess IPOs, what information they provide to the investment banking syndicate, and the factors they believe influence allocations. Although the theoretical IPO literature has tended to focus on information revelation, the survey raises doubts as to the extent of incremental information production and whether bookrunners are, in practice, able to infer investors' valuations from their bids. We find that investor characteristics, in particular broking relationships with the bookrunner, are perceived to be the most important factors influencing allocations, which supports the view that IPO allocations are part of implicit quid pro quo deals with investment banks.
1.

Introduction
Most existing theories that seek to explain persistent IPO underpricing assign an important role to investors, and, in particular, informed investors. Theories differ on the role that investors play. At the benign end of the spectrum, investors may have (or be able to produce) information that is valuable in pricing the issue, and a key design feature of the IPO process is then to incentivise investors to acquire and reveal this information to the investment banks running the IPO. On the other hand, the nature of integrated investment banks, combining advisory, research and trading activities, creates the potential for conflicts of interest. At this conflicted end of the spectrum IPO allocations are a quid pro quo for broking business. Although investors are central to the IPO process, little evidence has been produced as to how they assess IPOs, how they interact with the investment banks that run the issue, how they bid during the bookbuilding, and their perceptions of the factors that influence allocation. This paper provides the first analysis of the IPO process from the viewpoint of the investors, using survey evidence from a sample of fund managers who regularly participate in IPOs.
Given the pivotal role that investors play in all the major IPO theories, the investor survey allows us to throw light on the various views of the IPO process. We focus on IPOs conducted by bookbuilding, as it has become the dominant method of issuing in most countries. The bookbuilding approach gives considerable discretion to the investment bank regarding allocation, and explaining allocation has become a key research question (Ritter and Welch, 2002) . As noted by Jenkinson and Jones (2004) , three main explanations have been advanced to explain IPO allocations and pricing, which can be broadly categorised as information revelation, targeting particular investors (such as long-term investors or repeat customers of the investment bank) and conflicts of interest. Our survey covers all three explanations, and is designed to differentiate, as far as possible, between them.
Contributions to the literature have provided evidence on all of these theories, but the results have issues in detail, and we indeed find that bidding behaviour of investors does differ according to the perceptions of how hot the issue is.
Much of the academic literature on IPOs abstracts from potential conflicts of interest, despite the clear financial incentives, and even though regulators in various countries -most notably the US -have found evidence of IPO allocations being influenced by relationships with investors and corporate financing clients. However, some research has focussed on the potential for agency problems between investment banks and issuers. An early contribution from Baron (1982) noted that if investment banks had superior information than issuers, the effort of the investment bank in marketing the issue, and the offer price, might be below the first-best. More recently, Biais, Bossaerts and Rochet (2002) assume that the interests of the investment bank and issuer are not aligned and suggest that auction-like mechanisms may then be superior to bookbuilding. The importance of agency problems has also been noted by Loughran and Ritter (2002 Ritter ( , 2004 and Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2006) .
In addition, several recent empirical papers have investigated the relationship between IPO allocations and the generation of trading commission. Reuter (2006) finds a strong positive correlation between brokerage commissions paid by mutual funds and their holdings of stocks that have recently conducted an IPO. This provides some support for the conflicts of interest view, although the paper is also instructive in demonstrating the problems researchers face in analysing these important issues. In particular, a major constraint encountered by this paper, and most others in the IPO literature, is the lack of direct evidence on IPO allocations, and so it is necessary to infer allocations from month-end holdings of funds that reported their asset allocation in the same month as the IPO. Even then it is not possible to know how the fund management group as a whole -comprising the whole family of funds -had been allotted at the IPO. This constraint, as well as a lack of direct evidence on trading commissions, is also faced by Ritter and Zhang (2006) , who investigate whether IPO underwriters favour affiliated mutual funds, and Namalendran, Ritter and Zhang (2006) , who investigate whether there is a positive relationship between trading volume, and hence trading commission payments, in liquid stocks and subsequent money left on the table in IPOs. In this latter paper the authors find a significant relationship during the internet bubble period, but no economically significant impact in normal market conditions. Some of the most direct evidence that IPO allocations and trading commission are related, at least for the bubble period of 1999-2001 in the US, is found by Goldstein, Irvine and Puckett (2006) . They exploit data on individual trades and commission payments around the time of IPOs, and find that these are related to net sales in the immediate aftermath of the IPO (which are used to proxy IPO allocations). However, there are two common shortcomings with the literature to date: first, that many of the results are for quite specific time periods (in particular the US bubble period) before conflicts of interest in IPOs hit the headlines, and, second, that it that it is impossible to disentangle competing hypotheses, for instance whether allocations were related to information production, conflicts of interest, or the nature of the investor.
The first major advantage of conducting a survey of investors is that it is possible to construct the questions to provide information on all the major theoretical issues in a way that is simply impossible with the existing available data. A similar survey approach has been taken in respect of chief financial officers' views on IPOs by Brau and Fawcett (2006) . In our survey, we are able to ask directly which factors investors perceive as being most important to receiving a favourable allocation. We assign the factors into three groups: those associated with information production and exchange before the bookbuilding; those associated with bidding behaviour during the bookbuilding; and those associated with the characteristics of the investor. Our clear finding is that the latter group are perceived to be by far the most important in terms of receiving a favourable allocation. In particular, when we rank the responses the most important factor is perceived to be the extent of broking business with the investment banks running the IPO. Our paper therefore supports, albeit using very different methodology and a sample of investors mainly based in Europe, Reuter's results. 1 Other features of investors -such as being viewed as a long-term holder of the stock or being a large fund -are also viewed as very important in determining allocation. Factors reflecting bidding behaviour during the bookbuilding -which the existing literature has interpreted as being a proxy for information revelation -are generally viewed as the least important determinants of allocation.
The second advantage of our survey methodology is that it enables us to look in detail at the nature of information exchange during IPOs. The Benveniste and Spindt (1989) insight that investment banks' discretion over allocation could be used to incentivise information revelation, and therefore be beneficial for issuers, has been extremely influential, spawning a number of important papers (Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) , Sherman and Titman (2002) ), and has arguably become the dominant theoretical paradigm in the IPO literature. Yet there is virtually no systematic evidence about the nature of the information exchange between investors and the investment banks. In practice it is clear that the buy-side and sell-side interact extensively before the bookbuilding period (which we refer to as the pre-marketing period), and yet the existing empirical work focuses almost entirely on the nature of the bids submitted during bookbuilding. Such evidence is interesting but inevitably partial. For instance, it may be that an investor provides the investment bank with extensive feedback during pre-marketing that is useful in setting the initial price range, but then submits a strike (non-price sensitive) bid during the bookbuilding phase. The few papers, cited above, that have managed to obtain details of bids submitted during the Finally, the survey provides interesting evidence on the way investors formulate their views about the valuation of IPOs, and whether to invest. We find, on average, that only around one-half of the investors produce their own valuation models -which might serve as a proxy for incremental information production. We also present evidence on how investors bid, and how their bids relate to their valuations.
The survey finds considerable heterogeneity, with the incidence of limit bids depending on the perceived level of subscription, such limit bids being set below true valuation for the majority of investors, and these discounts typically increasing when the offering is perceived to be poorly subscribed.
Balanced against these considerable advantages of a survey methodology there are, of course, some important limitations. The responses to surveys are heavily influenced by the nature of the questions and by the sample of respondents. We reproduce our survey in full in an appendix. Although our sample of 57 respondents is limited, between them they assess, in an average year, around 2000 IPOs (as multiple investors analyse a given offering, the number of unique IPOs will be somewhat lower). We have coverage from most of the largest asset management companies, and also from a reasonable sample of smaller companies, including hedge funds. It is noteworthy, however, that our sample generates some clear statistical patterns, which suggests that the incremental value of increasing the sample size might be limited.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe our survey and the sample of respondents. We then report the findings of the three parts of the survey. In section 3 we consider pre-bookbuilding information production and exchange. How investors bid during the bookbuilding phase is considered in section 4. In section 5 we analyse investors' perceptions of the factors that influence IPO allocations. Section 6 contains a summary of our results and conclusions.
2.
The survey
Distribution and coverage of the survey
One of the main challenges in conducting a survey of institutional investors is to find an effective distribution channel to the relevant individuals within fund management companies, and to entice them to complete the questionnaire. Not only are the potential respondents extremely busy, but they are also bombarded with questionnaires from various quarters (including their clients, the various organisations that monitor institutional investors, regulatory agencies etc.) We were fortunate in having the support of two industry bodies, the Investment Management Association (IMA) and the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA). Both organisations are based in London, and are trade associations for the UK-based asset management industry. The IMA counts among its members most of the large investment management groups along with the investment arms of insurance, banking and investment banking groups. The AIMA is focussed on hedge funds. Outside the U.S., the U.K. is the country where the largest volume of assets is managed according to a P&I/Watson Wyatt September 2005 survey (which refers to the period during which our survey was conducted). According to the firms' own information, all the thirty largest non-UK-owned asset management groups listed in the P&I/Watson Wyatt survey manage assets in the UK, through either subsidiaries or representative offices. Indeed, although most of our respondents were UK-based, nearly half of these worked for firms owned outside the UK. And nearly half of the UK-based respondents, whatever the nationality of their ultimate owners, managed European or global portfolios, rather than UK portfolios. Hedge funds, which were part of our survey, are also heavily represented in the UK.
The survey was distributed to around 150 members of the IMA and 242 members of the AIMA.
Both these bodies circulated the survey by email to their members with an accompanying message encouraging their members to support the research. 2 The original email was sent during June 2005, and was followed up by a number of reminders. The responses were received in the following 3 months. There is some overlap between the memberships of these bodies, and so the total distribution was probably about 300. The survey, which is reproduced in the appendix, included a preamble assuring respondents that their answers would be treated in confidence, and that the analysis of the responses would be reported as averages or distributions. We gave three options for returning the questionnaire, either by email, fax or by post, which gave respondents the option of concealing their identity or that of their firm. In practice, almost all respondents returned the questionnaire with a covering note or email clearly identifying who they were and which asset management firm they worked for. 3 The survey is split into four sections. The first section asks for information about the respondents and the asset management company they work for. The second section focuses on pre-bookbuilding evaluation of IPOs. The third section asks questions about how the investor bids during the bookbuilding, and the fourth section asks for the perceptions of the investors as to which factors influence allocations.
The survey consists of 36 questions, and in most cases the answers are chosen from drop-down boxes giving a fixed set of alternative responses. 
The respondents
The 57 respondents are employed by 49 separate firms; the difference represents more than one respondent from a single firm. 5 Details about the sample are presented in Table 1 . Most responses (42 in total) came from fund managers; another 8 came from chief investment officers (CIOs), 5 from analysts and 2 from dealers. We asked respondents for information about the asset management company for which they worked, and the funds that they personally managed. Of the responses received, 31 were from firms with total assets under management (AUM) of over $36 billion, and 26 were from firms with less than $36 billion. Later in the paper we use this $36 billion threshold to define "larger" and "smaller"
investors. Many respondent firms form part of larger asset management organisations. If we take the total AUM of these groups, we received responses from 6 of the top 10 asset managers in the world by this measure according to Watson Wyatt's September 2005 survey, eleven of the top twenty and sixteen of the top hundred. Very large groups were therefore well represented among our responses.
All but 19 of our respondents stated an amount of funds that they managed themselves. The others, mainly CIOs and analysts, did not give a figure, but were assumed to be aware of how decisions to bid for IPOs were made in their firm. The size of funds managed by individual fund managers ranged from $40 million to $10800 million, with a mean of $1919 million and a median of $1140 million. CIOs tended to give the total AUM of their firm, or a large fraction, as the funds managed by them, but we exclude these from the figures presented in Table 1 .
All but 10 of our respondents were based in the UK. The others were based in Asia, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, South Africa and the US. The breakdown by nationality of respondent firm according to its ultimate owner (when we could identify the respondent's company) was as follows: 25 UK, 14 US, 3
Switzerland, and 2 each from France, Germany, Netherlands and S. Africa. Respondents were asked for their geographical investment focus. 51% had a European focus, 21% had a global focus, 18% were focussed on Asia or emerging markets and 11% had a US focus.
As for investment style, respondents were invited to specify their investment approach. Around one-half did so, and the responses, in order of frequency were, growth, core, value, hedge, small/mid-caps, and income. Finally we asked respondents how many IPOs they typically assessed in a year. The number ranged between 3 and 500, with a mean of 36 and a median of 20. The respondent who assessed 500 a year was a specialist IPO investor and had the smallest AUM figure. In a typical year, therefore, our respondents make nearly 2000 IPO evaluations.
Pre-bookbuilding information production and exchange
In most countries outside the U.S. and Japan, the interaction between the buy-side and sell-side starts when research is circulated by analysts working for the lead managers and, sometimes, more junior syndicate members (see Jenkinson, Morrison and Wilhelm (2006) for an analysis of the differences in IPO procedures across jurisdictions). In larger issues, research will often be produced by analysts whose banks are not part of the syndicate. The buy-side then evaluate the IPOs and decide whether to seek meetings with the lead managers and/or the management, and/or to attend the road show. The pre-bookbuilding evaluation will often involve the buy-side giving their views to the sell-side regarding the issue. The survey produced evidence on each of these steps.
Sell-side research
The survey asked respondents how many research reports they received for a typical IPO. The responses were tightly clustered in the 2-5 range, with a mean of 3.6 and the mode being 3. As expected, those fund managers who focussed on smaller company IPOs reported receiving fewer research reports, where 1-2 reports was more typical.
Fund managers were then asked which research reports they actually read, and the structured response offered to them distinguished between the analysts associated with the lead managers and "trusted analysts" (see Table 2 , Panel A). Of course, the analyst of a lead manager may also be "trusted", but the structuring of the responses was designed to ascertain whether fund managers tended to focus on the research of particular analysts because they were associated with the lead manager per se, or because they were, from past experience, trusted. The results of the survey show that fund managers rely not only upon the research produced by analysts associated with the underwriting syndicate, and that whether the analyst is trusted is, of itself, more important than whether the analyst works for a syndicate member. It is interesting to note that these research reports -which, as mentioned earlier, are not distributed in US IPOs -are clearly widely read, as all respondents read some of the reports, and 31% of investors read all the reports they receive.
Discussions with the sell-side and the management, and the road show
After receiving the research reports, a variety of discussions can take place involving investors.
Those members of the underwriting syndicate who are charged with selling the issue will usually approach investors with a view to discussing the IPO. It may also be possible for investors to have 1-on-1 meetings with the management (subject to time constraints). And there is also the road show, which investors can participate in either in person or, increasingly, via webcast. In Panel B of Table 2 we present evidence on the extent of participation in these meetings, and whether investors find them useful in forming a view about valuation.
Starting with meetings with the sell-side, 21% of investors said they always had such meetings and a further 44% reported that these meetings took place in a majority of IPOs. A simple summary of the responses -interpreting the responses "in a minority of IPOs" and "in a majority of IPOs" as 25% and 75% respectively -suggests that sell-side meetings take place for 65% of investors. However, the survey shows that fund managers are more likely to seek 1-on-1 meetings with management, with nearly one-half of investors always seeking such meetings and only 16% seeking meetings in less than one-half of IPOs.
Our summary measure of the incidence of 1-on-1 meetings (or strictly, the desire on the part of the investors to have such meetings) is 76%. In contrast, attendance at road shows is less frequent, with a summary incidence of 56%.
The three main reasons why investors might participate in such meetings are (a) that they are helpful in forming a view about valuation and whether to invest; (b) that investors might learn "soft" information about the offering -for instance whether the issue was proving popular with other investors;
and (c) that having such meetings might influence the likelihood of receiving a favourable allocation during the bookbuilding. We consider the latter hypothesis in section 5. When asked to describe how useful meetings were in terms of forming a view on valuation, the results clearly show that 1-on-1 meetings with management are viewed as the most useful: 42% of fund managers described 1-on-1 meetings as "very useful" and 30% viewed them as "essential". In contrast, sell-side meetings and the road show were, on average, viewed as between "marginally useful" and "useful".
Valuation and feedback to the sell-side
One of the main reasons for the design of the bookbuilding approach to conducting IPOs is in order to facilitate information production, and to incentivise investors to reveal valuable information to the investment bank running the IPO. In practice it is difficult to ask direct questions regarding the extent of information production. However, in order to become informed -beyond reading the analyst reports (outside the U.S.) or attending various meetings -it might be thought necessary to build a valuation model on the issuing company. Investors could, strictly speaking, form a view on valuation without building their own model, for example by using static earnings and cash-flow ratios, or by following a perceived consensus among other investors. However, the extent of information production in such cases might be quite limited, and so one plausible proxy for information production is the building of a valuation model.
It should be noted here that this part of the questionnaire relates to information production rather than to information revelation. It could be argued that any price-limited bid reveals information, truthful or otherwise, which is useful to the bookrunner. Here, however, we are trying to answer the question how much incremental information lies behind any information revealed.
The responses to the question "do you build your own valuation model" were fairly evenly spread, as reported in Panel C of Table 2 . Perhaps surprisingly, 19% of respondents said that they never built a valuation model and only 25% of investors always built their own model. The survey suggests that, in the average IPO, valuation models are only built by around one-half of investors. 6 All of the respondents were institutions managing equities on a fully discretionary basis; they were not therefore reflecting the sentiment of retail or other end investors, which might have otherwise explained a low percentage building their own model. On the other hand, respondents attended information sessions of all three types in the majority of IPOs. This begs the question why so many investors attended meetings if they did not intend to produce information? To investigate this question we consider the correlation between building a valuation model and the responses to other questions, which we present in information, which may be reflected back to the bookrunner in any limit they place on their bids. In the case of investors who build a valuation model, any price limit will reflect both the output of the model and the sort of market intelligence gathered at sell-side meetings. However, the survey responses suggest that such meetings may play a limited role in terms of incremental information production. Information seems to be flowing from the underwriter to investors, as well as vice versa, at this stage.
Alternatively, it might be conjectured that larger investors build models more often than small investors and so be better informed, since they presumably have access to more resources and the relatively fixed costs of constructing a valuation model will be spread across larger investments. This is not the case in our sample: the building of valuation models does not correlate with investor size. Larger investors (as defined earlier -those with AUM over $36 billion) build valuation models in 47% of IPOs, whereas smaller investors build valuation models in 53% of IPOs.
The survey next asked whether the investors gave their views on valuation to the investment banks: 40% percent of respondents gave their views in the majority of cases, with 21% always doing so.
We correlated these responses with those relating to the building of a valuation model, and found a correlation of -21%, which does not support the hypothesis that those investors who are more likely to have produced incremental information are more likely to reveal it. Indeed, this suggests that those who have not built a valuation model are more likely to express their views on valuation. However, since we are referring here to the pre-bookbuilding stage it is possible that those who have not produced incremental information have nothing to lose by revealing their views on valuation, while those who do produce such information are unwilling to give up their informational advantage before it can be rewarded through bookbuilding.
The final question in this section of the questionnaire asks how investors express their views on valuation. The most common approaches are to express the valuation as a price or as a valuation multiple, with somewhat fewer investors using discounts or premia to comparable companies.
The responses to this part of the questionnaire are interesting in three respects. First, although it is inevitably difficult to identify via a survey (or most other means) the extent to which investors engage in incremental information production, our proxy measure of building a valuation model suggests that only around one half of investors produce such information. Second, there clearly is a flow of information between investors and underwriters at the pre-bookbuilding stage -as witnessed by the widespread attendance at the various meetings. But the flow is likely to include information from underwriter to investor as well as vice versa. Third, the information revealed to the bookrunner in price limits is not necessarily produced by the investors who reveal it. It may also include second-hand valuations of others reflected to the underwriter, or may be a response to the investors' perception of the state of potential demand.
Bidding during the bookbuilding
During the bookbuilding investors may bid in one of three ways. First, by submitting a strike bid they accept whatever price is set for the issue up to the top of the indicative range, and so the only decision is how many shares to bid for. Second, with a limit bid the investor sets a maximum price for the quantity they demand. Third, if the investor wants to vary the quantity and price in a more complex way they can submit a step bid, which is equivalent to a series of limit bids. The next part of our questionnaire asked respondents what sort of bid they placed and why. The results are reported in Table 4 .
We asked fund managers which of these three types of bid they placed according to whether the IPO was perceived to be well-or poorly-subscribed. We found strong evidence that bidding behaviour indeed differs if the IPO is perceived to be hot. In such situations, 46% of investors reported that they would typically submit a strike bid, with a similar proportion submitting limit bids and 9% using step bids.
In contrast, in IPOs which are not perceived to be well-subscribed the vast majority of investors employ price-limited bids (either limit or step) with only 7% of investors submitting strike bids. This helps to explain one of the differences between Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) , who observe a much higher proportion of price-sensitive bids in their sample, and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) , whose sample of IPOs has a much higher average level of subscription.
Theoretical models of information revelation are generally silent on how and when information is revealed. If such information relevant to valuation were mainly being revealed through price limits on bids during the bookbuilding (as suggested by Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) ) and if that revelation were being incentivised by a more generous allocations, one might expect investors to express their views on valuation through limit bids more readily in well-subscribed offerings, as it is in those that allocations are more likely to be valuable. We return to the question of whether investors believe that bidding behaviour influences allocations in the next section, but the survey explores two further issues regarding bidding behaviour, which relate to the information revelation view.
First, we ask why investors submit a strike bid. It could be that investors are uncertain about valuation and simply prepared to accept consensus pricing, rather than exerting effort in arriving at their own valuation. In this case no information is being either generated or revealed. Alternatively, it is possible that investors place a value on the shares which is at least at the top of the indicative price range.
Therefore a strike bid could be read as a limit bid at the top of the range. In this case informativeness depends on whether the price range can be raised or not. If it can, a strike bid sets a floor to the bidder's valuation and is partially informative. If not, a strike bid could be seen as fully informative because any readiness to pay more is information irrelevant to the bookrunner. When asked why they submitted strike bids 13% of the respondents were prepared to accept consensus pricing while 63% did so because they valued the shares at least at the top of the indicative range. An important issue, therefore, is whether the indicative price range is itself revised, so that investors can re-bid in a potentially more informative way.
Jenkinson, Morrison and Wilhelm (2006) discuss the relationship between the stickiness of the indicative price range and information revelation prior to the bookbuilding period, and suggest that in those countries where price ranges are seldom revised, information revelation may be occurring during the pre-marketing period. However, we report in the next section that investors perceive their actions before or during the bookbuilding to have only a marginal impact on allocation.
The second issue we explore is whether, in the case of limit bids, investors bid their true value.
Information revelation theories suggest that discretion over allocation can be used to incentivise information production, and its revelation. According to the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979) it is not necessary for investors to bid their true value for their bids to be informative to the investment bank acting as the trusted central mediator. An equivalent mechanism could be for investors to bid systematically below their true valuation, and, if the issue price was set by the investment bank on the basis of these bids, then investors would automatically receive payoffs for participating in the bookbuilding. Therefore, the fact that 71% of the survey respondents -including the largest ten investors as measured by AUM -report that the price limits they set were typically below their true valuation cannot be interpreted in itself as evidence against information extraction. Our next question asked whether investors applied a consistent discount across IPOs -which would allow a simple grossing-up of bids to infer true valuations. Only 26% of respondents applied a consistent discount. The remaining 74% said that the discount they applied increased in poorly subscribed offerings. Again, this is not in itself evidence against an indirect information revelation mechanism, although the heterogeneous bidding strategies across investors and across issues that are reported in the survey suggest that, in practice, it may be very hard for the investment bank to interpret the varied information obtained during bookbuilding, and thereby to operate an optimal mechanism.
There are clearly other aspects of bidding during the bookbuilding -such as whether to bid early or late -but, since they do not influence valuation accuracy, these are interesting, in the main, only to the extent that investors believe that their actions influence allocation. We address such issues in the next section.
5.
What factors do institutional investors believe influence IPO allocation?
The previous two sections have focussed mainly on the role of investors in information generation and exchange. However, as noted in the introduction, there are alternative views of the factors that influence allocation which relate more to features of the investor per se than to actions they take during the IPO. In this section we present the results from the final part of the survey where we asked investors for their perceptions of the factors that influenced allocation (relative to demand). We focus on actions or characteristics that are observable to the bookrunner. These fall into three groups: engaging in prebookbuilding meetings; bidding behaviour during the bookbuilding; and investor characteristics. Among the latter group we include the extent of broking business with the bookrunner, whether investors are perceived as long-term holders of the stock, and whether the investor is a regular subscriber to IPOs conducted by the bookrunner.
The distribution of responses
Starting with pre-bookbuilding meetings, in Figure 1 we present the distribution of the responses.
Most investors perceive that meetings have at most a marginal impact on allocation. It is interesting that
this applies particularly to meetings with the sell-side and attendance at road shows: in both cases nearly 80% of respondents answered there was either no impact or a marginal impact on allocation. It seems likely that these meetings would be the ones where information might flow from investors to the investment banks and/or issuer. Attending one-on-one meetings with management is viewed as slightly more influential on allocation, but the overall impact on allocation is viewed as quite marginal.
In Figure 2 we present the perceptions of investors regarding the impact of bidding behaviour. We consider three types of behaviour: the size of the bid, the timing of the bid, and the type of bid. Of course, the size of the bid is related in part to the size of the fund -which we consider below under bidder characteristics -but in the questionnaire we distinguished between these two factors (after all, a large fund might put in a small order for an IPO). Of all the bidding characteristics, bid size is clearly viewed as the most significant determinant of receiving a favourable allocation (recall that the question explicitly asked about allocation rates -i.e. allocation relative to shares demanded).
In terms of timing of bids, early bids are viewed as having a positive influence on allocation, whereas the overwhelming majority of respondents viewed a late bid as having at best no impact on allocation, with nearly a quarter of respondents judging that late bids impact negatively on allocation. As to the question whether strike bids or limit bids are better allotted (in relation to one another), it is interesting to note that the responses in respect of strike and limit bids are quite similar, with only a modest positive impact of associated with submitting limit bids, and very few investors viewing bids per se as a critical determinant of IPO allocations.
We present information on the impact of investor characteristics in Figure 3 . It is immediately apparent that investors view this set of factors as far more significant as a determinant of allocation than either the pre-bookbuilding interaction or bidding during the bookbuilding. The extent of broking business with the bookrunner and the size of the fund are viewed as very significant determinants of allocation. Of course, there will be a correlation between the size of fund and the extent of broking business generated, but it does not necessarily follow that a large fund allocates broking business to the bookrunner of a given IPO. So the survey suggests that large funds per se receive significantly higher allocations. Being perceived as a long term investor also has a very positive impact on allocation (consistent with the findings of Jenkinson and Jones, 2004) , as does being a frequent subscriber to the IPOs of the bookrunner.
In summary, the raw responses suggest a clear view that investor characteristics are by far the most important determinant of allocation. In the next section we construct two summary measures of the average response across investors to allow simple comparisons between all twelve factors identified in the survey.
Comparing responses
In order to compare the influence of the various factors, in Figure 4 we summarize the average responses in two ways. In the upper panel we simply assign a numerical score, from 0 (negative impact) to 4 (critical impact) and report the average response across the investors. On this basis, the pre-bookbuilding interaction is viewed as being of marginal importance in terms of influencing allocation, with 1-on-1 meetings with management having a somewhat higher perceived impact than meetings with the sell-side and road-show attendance. Turning to the impact of bidding behaviour during the bookbuilding, the only action to reach "marginal" in significance is submitting an early order into the book. Late orders are viewed, on average, as having an impact close to zero (with 23% of the responses suggesting a negative impact on allocation). Interestingly, given the focus of the extant IPO literature, price-limited and strike bids have virtually the same average impact, with both being viewed by investors as having an impact that is well below "marginal". Indeed, bidding late is the only factor with a lower average impact. These findings raise some doubts about whether allocations are related in a significant way to the form or timing of investor bidding during bookbuilding.
In contrast, all the factors that reflect the nature of the investor have a systematically higher perceived impact on allocation. In particular, the extent of broking business with the bookrunner, being perceived as a long-term investor, and the impact of being a large fund all have an average response which is close to "significant". The perception of the impact of being a frequent subscriber to the IPOs of the bookrunner is only slightly less positive. Taken together, these results suggest that characteristics of investors, rather than their actions either before or during the bookbuilding, are perceived to have the dominant impact on allocation.
The top panel of Figure 4 , which summarizes the evidence in Figures 1-3 , provides information on the average absolute response for each factor, but does not allow for differences in the patterns of response across investors. In particular, the average response of investors can differ significantly, as can the variance of the responses. Consequently, the relative importance attached to the 12 allocation factorsboth for a given investor and between investors -will not be captured by a simple average of the raw responses. We therefore construct a variable measuring the relative importance of each factor, where we control for the average response of each investor. Specifically, for each investor we compute the mean and standard deviation of their responses across the 12 categories. We then measure how many standard deviations from the mean each response is. We average these deviations across investors, and compute the standard errors of the average responses to test whether each factor has a significantly higher or lower perceived impact than the average.
We present the evidence in the lower panel of Figure 4 , which reinforces the earlier pattern from the raw responses. In particular, the extent of broking business with the bookrunner emerges as the single most significant influence on IPO allocations, as perceived by investors, with large funds and long-term investors not far behind. In contrast, the type and timing of bids are viewed as relatively unimportant. In terms of interaction before the bookbuilding, only 1-on-1 meetings with management have a response which is, on average, above the mean (but is not statistically significant).
Given that the survey suggests that investor characteristics are the key determinant of IPO allocations, one interesting question is whether the perceptions of investors differ according to one of the key observable features: the size of their organisation (in terms of assets under management). We consider this next.
Do the perceptions differ according to size of investor?
The previous section found that the two most important factors that are perceived to influence IPO allocations are the size of the fund and the extent of broking business with the bookrunner. Although these are clearly distinct, in practice they may be correlated for many fund management organisations, and they are both related to question 1.3 of the survey, which asks "what are the approximate assets under management of your organisation?" To investigate whether the responses differ according to the size of the investor we split the sample roughly in half by considering separately those larger investors with total reported AUM above $36 billion and the smaller investors with AUM of less than $36 billion. Clearly, AUM is not the only feature that differentiates investors, but it is likely to be correlated with other features -such as whether the organisation is a hedge fund or long-only -on which we do not have complete information.
In Figure 5 we present the difference in the average responses according to the investor size categories. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most significant difference between the two groups relates to the perceived importance of fund size: the smaller funds believe that AUM is a much more important influence on allocation than the larger funds. However, it should be noted that both groups rank fund size as an important determinant: smaller funds rank it first in terms of influence (with an average z-score of +0.96) whereas larger funds rank it third (+0.44). In contrast, large investors view the size of the order as a more important determinant of allocation than smaller investors (although the difference is only significant at the 10% level). Interestingly, the groups have similar views on the importance of being perceived as a long-term investor, which ranked second in importance among the larger investors, and third by the smaller investors.
Small investors also perceive the extent of broking business with the bookrunner as relatively more influential than larger investors, although the difference is not statistically significant. Indeed, for large investors, broking business is perceived as the single most important positive influence on allocation, whereas for the smaller investors it ranks very slightly behind fund size (but broking business has a higher relative score -compared to the other potential factors -than for the large investors). This result reinforces the findings of the previous section: broking relationships are perceived to be a key factor influencing IPO allocations by large and smaller investors alike.
The other differences between the responses of the two investor groups are not very remarkable.
The only other factor where there is a statistically significant difference (again at the 10% level) between the average responses of the two groups relates to the impact of submitting limit bids, which are perceived to have a slightly higher relative influence by larger investors. However, recall that limit bids are used more frequently when an offering is perceived to be poorly subscribed, and that investors typically discount their bids more in such cases. Our findings might provide some weak evidence that larger funds are more able to influence pricing and allocation in such situations.
Conclusions
Despite the central importance of investors -especially informed investors -to all IPO theories, relatively little is known about their role in practice. This paper is the first to provide evidence on the IPO process from the perspective of the investors: how they assess IPOs, how they interact with investment banks, how they bid during the bookbuilding, and what factors they perceive as influencing the final allocation decision. Using survey evidence from a sample of 57 institutional investors, who between them assess around 2000 IPOs each year, we are able to provide information relevant to all the main theories in a way that is simply not possible given the existing limitations on available data.
The first set of interesting findings relates to our evidence on the role investors actually perform before the bookbuilding. Our survey suggests that in a typical IPO only around one-half of institutional investors would build their own valuation model. We take this as a proxy for generating incremental information regarding valuation. The remainder may rely (outside the US and Japan) on the research reports produced by analysts, which our survey suggests are widely read, and on discussions with the sellside and management. Although such meetings are commonplace, investors do not always perceive them to be particularly useful in terms of forming a view on valuation. Alternative conjectures about why the meetings take place include learning about other investors' views and the overall state of demand, and hoping to influence allocation -although our evidence on the latter suggests investors perceive any such influence to be very marginal.
The second set of results relates to the way investors bid during the bookbuilding. We find strong evidence that investors bid differently according to how well-subscribed the issue is perceived to be. responses of large and small investors are compared, the importance of broking relationships is confirmed by both groups. There is similar uniformity of view regarding the importance of being perceived as a longterm holder of the stock. On average, investors also perceive being a regular subscriber to the bookrunners' IPOs, and being a large fund as positively influencing allocations although, perhaps not surprisingly, smaller investors believe these factors are more important that larger investors.
In conclusion, although there are clearly limitations to survey methodology, it does enable us to understand how closely the assumptions of theoretical models relate to reality. The results of this paper suggest that academic research on IPOs should shift its focus somewhat away from information revelation and more towards the relationships between investors and the investment banks. This figure presents responses to the survey question: "Evaluate how important the following factors are to receiving a good allocation -relative to demand -of an IPO". The possible responses for the impact of the various factors were negative, none, marginal, significant, critical. The top figure presents the average raw responses. In the lower figure responses are normalised for each respondent by computing the mean and standard deviation of their responses across the 12 categories, using a scale from 0 (negative impact) to 4 (critical impact), and calculating Zvalues (how many standard deviations each response is from the mean). These Z-values are then averaged across respondents. ***, ** and * denote significant differences from the average response at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Broking business with bookrunner
Long-term investor This figure shows the average z-score for larger and smaller funds -defined according to whether the respondent reports that the organisation for which they work has above or below $36 billion under management. See Figure 4 for details of how the z-scores are calculated. ***, ** and * denote significant differences between the average responses for the two investor groups at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. This table shows the correlation coefficients between the response to the question "do you build a valuation model" and various other responses. In the case of questions where the possible responses are "never", "in a minority of IPOs", "in 50% of IPOs", "in a majority of IPOs" and "always", these are translated, respectively, into numerical scores of 0-4. A similar numerical translation is used for the questions where the possible responses are "of no use", "marginally useful", "useful", "very useful" and "essential". Price sensitive bids include limit bid and step bids, which are both given a score of 1; strike bids are designated 0. If, when submitting limit bids, investors typically bid below (equal to) their true valuation then their response is designated 1 (0). 
